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NIETZSCHE 
" Tad dem Schwachen" 
On account of the attention which Nietzsche has been attract-
ing of late, the occasion seems a favourable one for reviewing 
once more his life and work. In a letter to one of his acquaint-
ances, written in March, 1884, he himself prophesies with the 
proverbial modesty of genius that" in fifty years, perhaps, will 
the eyes of some few (or of one, for it requires genius) be opened 
to what has been done through me. For the present, however, 
it is not only difficult but quite impossible (in accordance with 
the laws of ' perspective ') to speak of me publicly without falling 
boundlessly short of the truth." To be sure, the time of which 
he spoke is not yet up; but since men's eyes are turned in that 
direction, it is fair to assume that the subject is not without 
interest at present. 
I. Life 
As for his life the task is comparatively easy. In one sense his 
thought is his life. But although his life is singularly narrow, his 
thought, as often happens in such cases, is unintelligible without 
an understanding of his character; and hence the very paucity of 
incident serves only to increase the difficulty of exposition. A 
rich and varied existence is virtually self-explanatory; a limited 
and unadventurous one, on the contrary, since it offers little or 
no surface to the critic, requires all sorts of commentary and 
exegesis for its illumination. For that reason what I have at-
tempted is quite as much characterization as biography. 
Nietzsche--christened Friedrich Wilhelm after the reigning 
king of Prussia, his father's patron-was born at Rocken on the 
border of Saxony on October 15, 1844. The stock of which he 
came was distinctly clerical, a fact which may account for some 
of his personal peculiarities, to say nothing of his antipathy for 
Christianity when he had once apostatized. His father, his 
grandfathers, one or more of his uncles were all evangelical 
pastors, while his paternal grandmother was of similar strain. 
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According to a vague tradition the family of Nietzsche was 
remotely of Polish origin and noble descent-an extraction which 
so flattered Friedrich's aristocratic propensities that he made at 
least one elaborate attempt to substantiate it. 
In 1849 occurred the death of his father, Karl Ludwig by 
name, in consequence apparently of a serious fall, which had 
reduced him to helplessness some time before this fatal result. 
On the basis of this lingering prostration of his father's, efforts 
have been made to prove that Friedrich's ill-health and mental 
disease were hereditary; but they appear to be anything but 
conclusive. In later life there is none of his misfortunes which 
Nietzsche more regretted than the accident which deprived him 
of parental companionship and guidance during his youth and 
early manhood; and it was only in the friendship of Wagner that 
he found anything like compensation for the loss. In addition 
an atmosphere of bereavement is not the most healthful for a 
precocious and introspective child; and after the death of his 
little brother, Joseph, when the family-consisting of his mother 
and his sister, Elizabeth-had removed to Naumburg on the 
Saale, where they lived with his father's mother and two maiden 
sisters, it is possible to detect the influence of these surroundings 
on his disposition and character. At the public school, to which 
he was sent at the age of six, he was known as der kleine Pastor, 
the little minister, on account of his decorum and gravity-such 
is the material out of which future "immoralists" are made. 
Even at that age he seems to have shown something of the 
priggishness which characterized him more or less throughout 
life and was particularly conspicuous during his brief stay at 
Bonn. 
His years in the private school to which he was transferred 
the following twelvemonth, as well as in the gymnasium which he 
entered in I854, affected his development, no doubt, as they 
were intended to do; but the most decisive event of his youth was 
his admission to Pforta in I858. Pforta may be described briefly 
as an endowed school of rather severe and cloistral tradition and 
discipline, once a Cistercian abbey, with a reputation for the 
incubation of scholars. Nietzsche's intellectual life had begun 
early. Even at fourteen he wrote respectable verse, he already 
composed music, and was concerned for problems that never 
occur to most Americans during the entire course of their lives. 
As a genius, to be sure, he may be thought to be an exception. 
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But after all the case is not so unusual abroad, and it is no 
exaggeration to say that in spite of our complicated system of 
education the French or German student in what corresponds to 
our preparatory school is far more mature intellectually than the 
mass of our college or university graduates. 
In his early years at Pforta Nietzsche founded a kind of artis-
tic and literary society, with two of his young Naumburg friends, 
for their independent culture and development. Each of the 
three members was to submit monthly a musical composition, a 
poem, or an essay, which was reviewed by,the chronicler for the 
quarter. Every three months a formal meeting was to be held, 
at which each member should present one of his own productions. 
Among Nietzsche's titles may be mentioned the following: 
Byron's Dramatic Works; Napoleon III as President; Siegfried, 
a Poem; Fatum and History; The Demonic in Music. Throughout 
his life, as may be inferred from this sort of venture, he was ever 
preoccupied-too exclusively so for healthy-mindedness-with 
his own intellectual development, to which he frequently found 
his prescribed duties a hindrance or an impertinence. On the 
whole, however, he may be described, in his sister's words, as a 
model student while at Pforta in all subjects except mathematics, 
which he had no taste for and neglected, and science, in which he 
seems to have made no great progress. Nor is the circumstance 
unimportant for his after thinking-particularly when his 
scientific pretensions are taken into account. It constitutes one 
of his most serious limitations-together with his slight acquaint-
ance with anthropology and ethnology. A knowledge of some 
other antiquity than the Greek and an initiation into the natural 
and social sciences might have saved him from several pre-
posterous vagaries, even if they had not modified profoundly the 
general bent and direction of his thought. From the first, 
however, his liking was for what the Germans call philology; his 
favourite subjects were Greek and Latin, particularly the former. 
In spite of the fact that his residence at Pforta was his first 
absence from home and he was subject to the shyness and the 
nostalgia of his kind, his health and spirits were sound, and for 
all his self-centredness he made at least two warm and lasting 
friendships-one with Paul Deussen, the other with FreiheIT 
Carl von Gersdorff, who clung to him pretty faithfully during 
life. 
In the fall of 1864 he entered the University of Bonn, where he 
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fell under the influence of Ritschl, the philologist. In the first 
enthusiasm of his new life as student he allied himself with a 
corps, Franconia, only to become offended by the loose, coarse 
manners of his companions-their Biermaterialismus, as he calls 
it. It was not for nothing that he had grown up beside a doating 
mother, grandmother, and two maiden aunts, to say nothing of 
an adoring sister younger than himself; and he soon provoked the 
dislike of his comrades by his tactless attempts to reform their 
habits. As a result he grew thoroughly disgusted with Bonn and 
retained all his days a prejudice against German conviviality, 
though he himself became an immoderate consumer of drugs and 
opiates. Anyone who spends the evenings in beer-drinking and 
pipe-smoking, he pronounces, is quite unfit to understand him or 
his philosophy, because such an one must necessarily lack the fine 
clarity of spirit essential to the comprehension of such nice and 
profound problems as those he is concerned for. The fact is that 
he was always most at ease by himself, as he afterwards confesses. 
Extremely sensitive to anything like oppositions of character and 
opinion, he never felt thoroughly at home, perhaps, except with 
his sister and one or two of his intimates of the moment-
though strangers and casual acquaintances he seems to have 
found less disquieting than others. A craving for friendship in the 
abstract he appears to have had; but the type of friendship he 
desired was that of master and disciple. Like most of us he 
probably longed for the moral stimulant of approval and ad-
miration; he liked to see himself advantageously reflected in the 
eyes of others. But most of his actual friendships ended dis-
astrously and not all of them with dignity. It was to his sister 
that he owed the most; with the exception of a few years of 
marriage she has devoted her life to him and his memory. To 
her exertions, it is not too much to say, some part of his present 
fame and currency is due. She has written two lives of him-
a larger and a smaller one; she has collected and edited his works; 
she has founded a Nietzsche archive at Weimar and has got 
together and preserved every extant note and scrap of writing 
in his hand, including his letters, which she has been able to come 
at; she has defended his character against posthumous detraction 
and she has laboured incessantly to enlarge and extend his 
reputation. Whatever her brother's genius, she at all events is 
in her way a sister who deserves celebration with Renan's and 
Pascal's, with Henriette and Jacqueline. 
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In the fall of the next year (1865) Nietzsche left Bonn for 
Leipzig, partly for the sake of ridding himself of the embarrass-
ments he had incurred in the former place and partly for the sake 
of following Ritschl, who had been called to the latter university. 
Of Nietzsche's formative period the three great influences were 
Greek antiquity, Schopenhauer's philosophy, and Wagner's 
music and personality. The first of these dates from his boyhood 
-specifically, perhaps, from his schooling at Pforta, though he 
was interested in the subject as a boy might be even earlier and 
played Homer while yet a child. But the Greek antiquity that 
actually inspired him and seriously affected his life and thought 
was a Greek antiquity of his own invention, not that after the 
tame official pattern-a Greek antiquity that never existed for 
any other than himself. The second formative influence, that of 
Schopenhauer's philosophy, dates from his first year at Leipzig. 
In one of his autobiographical sketches he has an interesting 
account of stumbling upon a copy of the great pessimist in the 
stall of a bookseller with whom he lodged, of carrying it off to his 
rooms, and of immersing himself in the contents with a conviction 
of having at last found the key to the riddle. And conceivably 
enough there was much in Schopenhauer to suit his humour at 
this time. Temperamentally there was a kind of perversity, a 
sort of offishness, a disposition to see things wrong side out that 
was after his own heart. While conceptually the idea of exist-
ence as a representation would appeal to a something artistic in 
his nature-which he himself developed later, in his own manner, 
into the dogma of life as a vital illusion, intelligible only as a work 
of art, the diversion of an uneasy god for the relief of his own 
ennui and discomfort. N or is his final philosophy of the will to 
power unbridgeably remote from Schopenhauer's notion of the 
will to existence as the fundamental principle of life. There is 
even at this time a prognostic of his future" immoralism" in one 
of his letters dated April 7, 1866, where in describing a storm by 
which he was overtaken in one of his walks, he exclaims: 
"What were man and his fretful desires to me! What to me was the eternal 
'thou shalt' and' thou shalt not!' How different the lightning, the storm, and 
the hail-free unethical forces! How blessed, how strong are they, pure will, 
untroubled by the intellect!" 
At Leipzig, too, during his first year he established a kind of 
superior or advanced Germania, the Philological Society, and 
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made what he calls his first friendship founded on a moral and 
philosophical basis-with Edwin Rohde, a fellow student; 
'( Weltanschauungsbruder" he names him. 
On the whole he appears to have been at this period a rather 
superior young person with a turn for self-analysis and Selbst· 
qualerei-a Qualgeist in his own words--oppressed by a heavy 
sense of his responsibilities to himself. In his letters of this or a 
little later date it is possible to detect those dawning suspicions 
of philology and philologists and their value as a discipline or 
culture-even a glimmering distrust of modem education in 
general-which were finally to make him objectionable to his 
own profession and which he developed in his Untimely Considera-
tions. In short, he begins already to betray a little of that self-
sufficiency of opinion which became his leading intellectual 
characteristic. 
In the autumn of 1867 he began his term of military service 
in an artillery regiment stationed at Naumburg. He was ex-
tremely near-sighted, an infirmity which he blames for many of 
his embarrassments of one kind and another; and on that account 
he had supposed himself exempt from military duty. But the 
requirements had recently been lowered, such was the need of 
recruits; and he found himself within the army net after all. 
While he performed his tasks punctiliously and to the satisfac-
tion of his officers, he was not particularly happy in them because 
of his separation from his friends and his intellectual pursuits. 
His career, however, was cut short in the early part of the follow-
ing year by an accident to his chest, incurred while mounting his 
horse and due to his shortsightedness. So severely was he hurt 
that it took him five months to recover. 
His return to Leipzig in the fall of 1868 as a private teacher is 
remarkable as the occasion of his introduction to Richard Wagner, 
who was visiting a sister, the wife of Professor Brockhaus. 
In the beginning of 186<), before he had yet taken his doctorate, 
he was appointed extraordinary professor of classical philology 
at Basel with a salary of 3000 francs. Thereupon Leipzig granted 
him his degree without thesis or examination. The appointment 
was due largely to the recommendation of Ritschl and was 
considered a remarkable honour for a man of Nietzsche's age. 
With his usual reserves, however, he himself failed to look upon 
it as a subject of unmixed self-con gratulation-he had been 
planning a sojourn in Paris in the interests of his further educa-
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tion; and it was with some sense of disloyalty to his aspirations 
that he finally set out for his post in the spring of 1869. His 
entrance address was delivered on May 28 and seems to have 
made a mild sensation. It consisted of a discussion of the 
Homeric problem with particular reference to the ideal office of 
philology in human life. His lectures were attended by an 
audience of eight-the entire body of philological students at 
Basel, together with one theologue. In addition to his courses 
in the university he had some school-teaching in the ancient 
languages. In any proper sense, however, his professional work 
as such lies outside of his development and may be disregarded 
save as it affects the latter through his material circumstances. 
His growth from now on is virtually independent of universities; 
from this point of view it is his intimacy with Richard Wagner 
which is the event of his residence at Basel. 
As Nietzsche's conception of truth may be said to constitute 
the paradox of his thought or philosophy, so his relations with 
Wagner constitute the paradox of his life or experience. That the 
same man who wrote the invective contained in Wagner's Case 
and Nietzsche contra Wagner should once have been Wagner's 
familiar and intimate seems incredible or monstrous. For years 
he had known and admired one or two of the musician's earlier 
operas-the Meistersinger and Tristan und Isolde. But it was 
not until the period of his professorship that he fell completely 
under Wagner's influence. At that time the Wagners were living 
in obscurity at Tribschen near Basel-Wagner himself; Cosima, 
his wife, formerly von Bulow's; and Siegfried, the son-and there 
Nietzsche visited them in accordance with an invitation extended 
him at Leipzig. The intimacy was soon cemented; the strength 
of the Master's personality and the seduction of Cosima's 
exerted their natural effect upon the dazzled young professor, 
whose fresh and ingenuous admiration must have warmed and 
tickled the disappointed old sensualist delightfully ; Wagner was 
then about sixty years old and a disciple of Feuerbach before 
Nietzsche converted him to Schopenhauerism. The younger 
man, for his part, must have been immensely flattered by the 
attentions of a genius, whom he himself had had the perspicacity 
to discern amid the general blindness and density of the con-
temporary pUblic. In a short time he became almost a member 
of the family. "After Cosima, you-and then for a long way, no 
one, " protests Wagner in a letter to his address. While in his 
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turn Nietzsche produces upon the altar of friendship The Birth of 
Tragedy from the Spirit of Music, a singular compound-a cen-
taur, the author well named it-in which a fanciful theory of 
Greek tragedy is supplemented, in the very spirit of the first 
generation of romanticists, by a fantastic derivation of Wagner-
ian opera from Athenian (or as Nietzsche would say, Dionysian) 
tragedy. As a sacrifice to the temple the tribute was complete. 
The Wagners were enraptured with it. But Nietzsche's colleagues 
were dumbfounded and offended at its extravagance. Even he 
himself acknowledged later that he had prostituted his scholar-
ship to his infatuation and had ruined his academic reputation 
for the sake of the Wagners. As a result students were warned 
away from the university; for a year his class-room was deserted, 
Basel was destitute of students of classical philology. 
The fate of this first book of his, however, was in no wise 
exceptional. As a matter of fact all of Nietzsche's writings were a 
disappointment, if nothing worse, to his friends and well wishers. 
Even the staunchest of them, with one or two possible exceptions, 
fell away from him as he proceeded with the development of his 
peculiar doctrine-particularly after the appearance of Human 
All Too Human. During the latter part of his short career, what 
with misunderstandings and quarrels, he found himself pretty 
nearly alone in the world, save for his devoted sister and his 
faithful adherent, K6selitz, known to Nietzscheans as Peter Gast. 
It is his alienation from Wagner, however, that he regards 
with constant bitterness as the great tragedy of his life. To 
account for that sequestration is anything but easy. For three 
years the friendship continued with unabated warmth until the 
Wagners left Tribschen for Bayreuth in expectation of carrying 
through the project of the great opera-house. Thereafter the 
two parties saw each other only occasionally. Relieved of 
Wagner's imposing presence, Nietzsche had an opportunity to 
make a return upon himself and to think his own thoughts un-
hindered. That Wagner had deflected his ideas to a certain extent 
is unquestionable. Wagner's was an exigent personality, tyran-
nous and intolerant, and not indisposed to take possession of 
another, body and soul. That Nietzsche had early begun to 
conceive reserves, even concerning Wagnerian opera, is evident 
too. But the crisis was postponed until the presentation of the 
Ring of the Nibelungen at Bayreuth in 1876. That others beside 
Nietzsche were disappointed and disabused by the performance 
NIETZSCHE 321 
wrong side to; while with everything upon which the human art of slander and 
abuse had heretofore been exercised the most skilfully, I did the contrary." 
The procede is evident and it is characteristic. 
I have dwelt so long upon the case of Wagner because it is not 
merely the most important episode in Nietzsche's objective 
existence and is also the turning point, the hinge of his career, 
but because it illustrates a peculiarity of his mind without which 
it is impossible, it seems to me, to understand either the man or 
his philosophy. From some cause or other his consciousness was 
extremely susceptible to polarization. Almost any idea which 
attracts his attention to begin with, ends almost invariably by 
violently repelling him. Hence he is always at one extremity of 
opinion or the other without mediating between the extremes or 
occupying the intervening space. By this mental idiosyncrasy 
is to be explained or at least expressed his final alienation from 
all his friends as well as his hostility to every idea in which he was 
brought up-to Christianity, morality, respectability, and con-
venience, middle-class smugdom, scholarship, philology-even to 
his own character and being. In fact, it serves pretty nearly as a 
formula for all·his philosophizing: what else in its essence is his 
great discovery of the transvaluation of all values? 
In the meanwhile, during his intimacy with Wagner, his 
academic duties were momentarily interrupted by the Franco-
Prussian War, which he followed for several months as a member 
of the ambulance corps, since his naturalization as a Swiss 
citizen prevented him from fighting with the German army. 
From this excursion, which was a reign of horror to him and 
haunted his dreams for long afterward, he returned with a severe 
dysentery and diphtheria, of which he was cured with some 
difficulty and with lasting damage to his digestion. How much 
these infections had to do with his breakdown a few years later 
it is impossible to determine. The problem of his health is an 
exceedingly teasing one, upon which it is hardly safe for a 
stranger and a layman to venture. Nor in one sense is it a par-
ticularly important one in itself. That he should have thought 
and written so much about it himself is natural enough; in the 
critic the same interest is a symptom of morbid curiosity. What 
is certain and important is that soon after the war his health 
began to fail. He was tormented by atrocious headaches and 
nausea, which reduced him to a misery of helplessness. In one 
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appears from his sister's bjography. Was this the great idealistic 
movement of the future-this mercenary, flirting, faineant 
concourse; was this the stuff of noble reforms and vital enthusi-
asms? Nor was the opera itself with its veiled sensualism and 
neurotic excitability what the youthful Schwarmer had heard in 
his imagination. 
Psychologically it is only natural that as we begin to lose 
importance for an undertaking that undertaking should likewise 
lose importance for us. As long as Nietzsche saw his own person 
interested in Wagner and his work, so long it is intelligible that 
he should have been the latter's admirer and supporter. While 
Wagner is generally unrecognized and at odds with the world, so 
long is there an obvious distinction in standing his friend and in 
recognizing what few or none else has the wit to see. As his 
preferred interpreter and appreciator Nietzsche is on a level 
with him-in a sense he is a superior. He can congratulate 
himself that Wagner's fame, if it ever rises, is in part his own 
work. But as soon as Wagner removes to Bayreuth and finds 
himself on the road to success, surrounded by a crowd of flatter-
ers and fawners among whom his quondam friend is numerically 
lost, just so soon Nietzsche becomes disaffected. And so too at 
somewhere near the same time he ceases to feel sufficiently illus-
trated by his discipleship to Schopenhauer; he is discontented at 
deriving or seeming to derive from another-such dependency, no 
matter how renowned, is no longer a sufficient title of distinction. 
At this stage it is apparent that if Friedrich Nietzsche is to have a 
philosophy, it must be unmistakably different from everyone's 
else, it must be a creed peculiarly his own. There has broken in 
upon him the brilliant conception of the reversal or transvalua-
tion of all values. And to this task he addresses himself in his 
Human All Too Human, a book which I take to be the index of 
the beginning of his second period. 
Some years afterward he describes his own state of mind at 
this time, and the description is important because it helps to 
span the gap which exists in his written record between his first 
and second periods-a gap which it is hard to bridge except by a 
reference to his own consciousness. 
"A great and ever greater detachment, a capricious straying afield, an 
estrangement, a cooling off, disenchantment-only this and nothing more 
was what I longed for in those days. I tested everything to which my heart 
had hitherto clung, I reversed the best and dearest things and looked at them 
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year, he reckons, he lost a hundred and eighteen days in this 
wise. After a year's leave of absence and a renewed attempt to 
carry his academic work he was finally obliged to resign his 
professorship in 1879, at the age of thirty-five, after having filled 
his position ten years. Of its own accord the University of Basel 
granted him a pension of 3000 francs annually. On this sum, 
together with his own private income of 400 marks or so a year, 
he continued to live-mainly in Italy and Switzerland, wandering 
back and forth between the peninsula and the Engadine, with 
occasional flying visits to Germany, now worse, now better, but 
always reflecting, composing, publishing until the end. 
That Nietzsche suffered from suppressed or incipient madness 
the greater part of his life or that his work is that of a maniac-
charges which are still repeated and which may owe their vogue 
to Nodau's Degeneration-such a notion is absurd. The mysteri-
ous nature of his malady may have something to do with such 
suspicions of his mental sanity. Even his doctors disagreed 
among themselves. At first it was supposed that the seat of the 
disease was the stomach. But his sister in her latest biography 
speaks as though it were now authoritatively referred to his eyes, 
which were painfully near-sighted and which were at times 
so badly affected as to incapacitate him for reading or writing 
-a condition which was regarded at the time as a secondary 
symptom. As for his mind, however, that appears, until just 
before his prostration, to have been as sane as a modern genius's 
usually is. 
On the other hand, that his consciousness was affected by his 
ill health, and indirectly his thought too, there is every reason 
to believe. Indeed, the fact is proved by his practice of composing 
in short detached passages, whose length varies with his condi-
tion. His constant preoccupation with the matter is pretty 
good evidence too. He is forever trying to make out that he is 
strong and vigorous or else that his sickness is an advantage and 
a privilege. Either his disease is but excess of health, or it is a 
kind of tonic-at least a moral purgative. And his sister is 
troubled by the same preoccupation. The coincidence argues 
some ground of uneasiness on the part of both which they were 
equally anxious to allay. 
As an invalid he oscillates between two poles. In the first in-
stance he was eager to justify or excuse his own condition. Hence 
his early pleas in favour of ill-health and suffering as a means of 
NIETZSCHE 
discipline and illumination. Later, however, with the growing 
conception of the superman his admiration of strength becomes 
predominant, though it is still on the basis of his own experience 
that the part which pain comes to play in the education of the 
superman is to be explained; who can not bear pain in his own 
person and in that of others is unworthy of the election. Physi-
cally invalided himself he values nothing so much as force and 
robustiousness. Hence his later efforts to refer his ills to a sur-
plusage of health and vigour. Envying a plenitude of life above 
everything, he comes to believe that everyone is animated by the 
same emotion and to propose the will to power as the moving 
principle or instinct of life. His superman too, as the realization 
and embodiment of this will to power, has the characteristics of 
his creator. His ideal is not the ideal of the strong man; it is 
the ideal of the weak, who is possessed by the consciousness of 
his own powerlessness and who in acute attacks of mortification 
would like to revenge his own debility upon his neighbour. 
After his resignation from Basel Nietzsche's life was in the 
main a solitary one. Most of his early friends had fallen or soon 
fell away from him, estranged by his outrageous opinions. Nor 
was he himself the man to suffer a partial allegiance. He com-
plains frequently of Wagner's illiberalism; but in his own case 
there was nothing more irksome than the presence of those whom 
he suspected of reserves against him and his ideas. "I am not 
strong enough," he says, "to contend continually with all the 
secret thoughts, the unspoken contradictions of my friends." 
After his break with Wagner he seems never to have enjoyed 
free intercourse with a man of his own stature capable of holding 
head against him. His associates were younger men or women or 
inferior intellects or characters. In this way he missed the 
correction that he might have gained from criticism and opposi-
tion. This disregard of others may serve to explain a kind of 
overbearingness in the expression of his ideas, which accounts in 
turn for their offensiveness to the generation for which they were 
written. For after all there was nothing so very singular, even 
forty years ago, in the substance of his thought; it was no more 
obnoxious in itself than the ethics of Helvetius and Holbach. 
But its temper is entirely different. There is an intentness, 
together with a very perceptible contemptuousness, about the 
expression which produces another impression altogether. It is 
the personality of the author as revealed in his style-a something 
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wilful and disquieting. His habit of abusing things accounted 
sacred, his disrespect for great traditional personages, his manner 
of apostrophizing ordinary humanity as "cattle" and "brutes" 
and "beasts," and current morality as the morality of the "herd"; 
his own assumption of superiority as an "immoralist" and a 
" Freigeist" and a "maker of values" ; his recklessness not only of 
the reader's prejudices and prepossessions but also of the difficul-
ties and obscurities of his own exposition-these traits irritated 
and offended and repelled the public, who must have felt some-
thing of the same impatience and indignation as the members of 
his corps at Bonn when he tried to lecture them on their manners. 
In addition to lack of recognition his later life was embittered 
by two incidents-his sister's marriage and departure to Paraguay 
with Forster and the undignified and ridiculous entanglement 
with Lou Salome, afterwards Frau Andreas. That Nietzsche 
should have resented his sister's marriage as a defection is not 
astonishing in view of the fact that Forster represented principles 
that were thoroughly distasteful to him-vegetarianism and anti-
Semitism-while the colonizing expedition to Paraguay was in 
his opinion of an abhorrently levelling or democratic tendency. 
The breach, however, was only temporary; even before his 
sister's departure he had become reconciled to it-the worst of the 
affair was that he was deprived of her ministrations at the very 
time when he stood most in need of them. 
The affair with Lou Salome was more intricate and likewise 
more amusing. Nietzsche had always been eager for disciples. 
In the beginning and during his first period he seems to have 
nursed the belief that he was actually addressing himself to some 
portion of the youth of his time and country. Of this audience, 
which he supposed to be secretly in sympathy with such views as 
his, he dreamed of making himself the prophet and leader. This 
elect, he thought, was ready and waiting for the word and would 
rise and rally upon him when he had once spoken it. The dis-
appointment which followed upon the successive publication of 
his writings was one of the great mortifications of his life. Under 
these circumstances, when one of his oldest friends, the elderly 
Fraulein von Meysenbug, wrote him that she had at last dis-
covered his disciple, his satisfaction struggled with his incredulity. 
That the disciple was a young woman of twenty-four was appar-
ently no drawback, though Nietzsche himself seems at times to 
have caught a fleeting glimpse of the absurdity of the whole 
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affair. In reality, the young lady-Lou Salome by name-who 
was a Russian touring Europe with her mother, appears to have 
been something of an adventuress and tufthunter and was 
probably attracted to the pursuit of Nietzsche by his friends' 
report of him as a celebrity. That she was naturally clever is 
evident from the manner in which she played up to the ingenuous 
philosopher. In spite of her mother's amazed denials she rep-
resented herself as a martyr to truth, whose youth had been 
consumed in a fruitless search of wisdom; and she completed 
her conquest by composing a poem To Pain, which ravished 
Nietzsche by its reflection of his own ideas. If any farther doubt 
of her eligibility lingered in his mind it was dispelled by her assur-
ance, quoted in his correspondence, that she was a woman with-
out morality-videlicet, an "immoralist." In accordance with 
her conception of" Freigeisterei" she proposed toseeksomeuniver-
sity, where she might reside in company with him and his friend 
Dr. Ree, the ethic philosopher. This offer, however, seems to 
have shaken the gentlemen a little; and as a via media Fraulein 
von Meysenbug suggested that one of the men should marry her. 
The suggestion proved unacceptable: Nietzsche declined because 
of his poverty and Dr. Ree because of his principles-he was a 
pessimist and viewed the continuance of his species with horror-
a devotion to conviction which Nietzsche highly applauds. For 
these reasons the project was abandoned; Lou Salome was obliged 
to content herself with private lessons in the Nietzschean philos-
ophy under the chaperonage of its author's sister. Is it necessary 
to add that as soon as the pupil discovered that her master was 
not the personage he had been represented by his friends, her 
ardour for his teachings began to cool? In the chill of reaction her 
conduct and language gave just offence to Nietzsche's sister; and 
at last Nietzsche himself discovered her genuine character and 
her perfect indifference for his ideas. Worse, he became suspi-
cious of some hugger-muggery on the part of Dr. Ree; and the 
affair closed with an embroilment of all parties and left for years 
a sour taste in Nietzsche's mouth. 
This anecdote I have related in some detail, not for the sake 
of ridiculing Nietzsche, but by way of illustrating his ignorance of 
human nature-a subject of which a great moralist might be 
expected to have some knowledge or apprehension. Unlike La 
Rochefoucauld and La Bruyere he had, indeed, no profound 
experience of mankind in the large. He had lived for no great 
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length of time in any great centre of thought or activity. He had 
known few men of light and leading-save Wagner. He had 
frequented no very distinguished circles and listened to no 
exchange of significant ideas. He had spent his time pretty much 
in solitude, in isolated lodgings, or casual boarding-houses. His 
study of human nature was confined almost exclusively to 
himself and his own anxieties. At the same time his reading was 
restricted for years by the weakness of his sight, while the bulk 
of his earlier studies was necessarily scholastic. As a result his 
moral philosophy was in large part erdacht not erlebt; it was spun 
out of himself and in so far liable to error-it was constantly in 
danger of losing touch with actuality and of forgetting Pascal's 
pensee de derriere. These were the characteristics that grew upon 
him toward the close of his career. It is dangerous for the moral-
ist to make a habit of himself; even the exaggeration of his own 
qualities is a misfortune. But it was particularly hazardous for 
Nietzsche, with his excitable temper, like some unstable explo-
sive, and with his disposition to megalomania. With Zarathustra 
the conviction of his prophetic role is inalterably fixed. "I am 
that predestined being," he declaims, "who is to determine 
values for centuries." He goes out of his way to vituperate 
Wagner, Socrates, and Jesus, whom he looks upon as his personal 
rivals. He revolves about himself and his own centre more and 
more dizzily and light-headedly. Never remarkably continent 
in the assertion of his own importance--at least in his letters to 
his friends-his exaltation and extravagance increase from day to 
day. He projects a systematization of his philosophy and plans 
to give the gestation of the work the benefit of a visit to Corte 
in Corsica, where Napoleon was conceived. As the end ap-
proaches he loses all sense of measure, and in the final paroxysm 
of his reason, with the relaxation of his inhibitions, he subscribes 
his letters with the names of Dionysus and the Crucified. 
It was such signatures as these which aroused the suspicions 
of his friends in Basel and brought Overbeck thence to Turin, 
where Nietzsche then was. On his arrival Overbeck found that 
he had suffered what seemed to be an attack of paralysis and that 
his mind was seriously affected. This was in December, 1888, 
while unfortunately his sister was still absent in South America. 
He was brought to Basel and thence transferred to an asylum in 
Jena. In the course of another year he was removed to Naum-
burg, where he was cared for by his mother and later by his sister, 
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who returned to Germany after the death of her husband in 
Paraguay. On the death of his mother in 1897 his sister carried 
him to Weimar, where she nursed him devotedly until his death 
in 1900. 
2. Doctrine 
Such in outline was Nietzsche's life. To summarize his 
thought is by no means so easy. Not only were his ideas con-
stantly shifting with his mood and surroundings, but he was an 
unsystematic thinker by profession. In addition, there is an 
inclination on the part of the hierophants of orthodox Nietzsche-
ism to soften and mollify and sweeten whatever is harsh or bitter 
or offensive in his philosophy-to accommodate his teaching to 
the taste of the public and so denature it. To read his sister's 
expositions you would think it less a philosophy of revolt than 
a philosophy of reservation. Contemporary criticism too, in 
accordance with its usual character, has been wonderfully indul-
gent and has contented itself, as a rule, with picking out what it 
could commend without much regard for ensemble or general 
tendency. Under these circumstances it would be difficult 
enough to rrlethodize his doctrine; but the difficulty is increased 
tremendously by his habit of writing in detached and discon-
nected paragraphs, whose length fluctuates with the changes of 
his bodily temperature, ranging from the compass of an aphorism 
to the dimensions of a brief section or chapter. His composition 
too was done largely out of doors during his solitary walks or 
rambles. No literary work was ever more dependent upon its 
author's health and spirits than his; for this reason his philo-
sophic periods are pretty nearly a physiological record and it 
may be well to classify them roughly before I undertake to 
sketch his system. 
If we leave out of account his youthful and prentice work, 
his first or coherent period extends from his appointment to Basel 
in 1869 to the year 1876 and the rupture of his friendship with 
Wagner. The principal writings included in this period are The 
Birth of Tragedy and the Untimely Considerations. I have 
named this his coherent period because the work of this time has 
the form of consecutive essays or articles. The inspiration of the 
period is undoubtedly Richard Wagner; its leading idea, the 
conception of the world as an resthetic product. In The Birth of 
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Tragedy he undertakes, in his turn, a favourite exercise of the 
first generation of German romanticists-the deduction of Ger-
man from Greek literature. But whereas the efforts of his pre-
decessors were directed toward establishing Goethe as the heir 
of Greek antiquity, his own were bent upon making Wagner 
the successor of .fEschylus and what he termed Dionysian tragedy. 
At the same time he labours also to substantiate the hypothesis 
already referred to, that the universe is intelligible only as a work 
of art, a kind of play or dramatic spectacle, perhaps, for the 
recreation of a weary creator. Elsewhere, as in The Future of our 
Educational Institutions and David Strauss and The Advantages 
and Disadvantages of History, appear presages of his revolt against 
the received and current ideas of his age and society-his con-
tempt for German pedantry and German K ultur in general and 
for the reigning historical methods of thought and scholarship. 
For the modern Prussian intellectualism, which has found such a 
ready acceptance in American education, never had a more 
relentless enemy than Nietzsche. Always a revolte, a mutineer, 
an insurgent, he can not be understood unless there is taken into 
account his disposition to rise against established ideas and 
institutions. At all events such is the direction of his evolution 
-toward a consistent and habitual opposition. 
His second period, which may be called inclusively his inco-
herent or aphoristic period, stretches from 1876 to the end of his 
intellectual career in 1888. During these years not only is his 
strength insufficient for consecutive composition but as a result 
and with his neurasthenic inclination to erect his weaknesses into 
virtues he begins to look upon discursive thinking as a symptom 
of decadence. It is at this stage of his development that his 
writings come to take on the tone that we think of as distinctively 
Nietzschean-timidly at first but more and more audaciously as 
he proceeds. His revolt has begun. And it is against his veritable 
self as well as everything representative of his age that his attack 
is directed. Himself he is weak and sickly and neurotic, limited 
in experience by means and health and opportunity; the offspring 
of a Christian evangelical stock; a tame, middle-class, German 
scholar; a more or less conscionable creature, priggish, thin-
skinned, and sentimental; a romanticist by disposition, with a 
philosophical descent from Rousseau through Kant and Schopen-
hauer; while the thing he admires is-Cesar Borgia, the bold, 
strong, unscrupulous, remorseless human animal, the "great 
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clear to him that he will not be contented with any ordinary 
philosophy. Of philosophy, particularly of moral philosophy, 
indeed, he has come to be exceedingly jealous; he grudges her 
any lord but him. Hence his mounting scorn of Plato and 
Socrates; hence his rising suspicion of Jesus, though he has not 
succeeded in rationalizing his distaste for these personalities so 
consistently as he will yet do. 
As his health improves, his temper becomes rather more 
sanguine; he gains a little greater mastery over his logical 
processes; his aphorisms lengthen-and there begins to dawn 
what I will call his auroral sub-period from the title of its princi-
pal work, Aurora (MorgenrOthe) , 1881, which was followed in 
1882 by The Merry Science. Save for the improvement in his 
mental tone and the increased length of his paragraphs it would 
be difficult to state in so many words the difference between this 
sub-period and the preceding. The former is merely a develop-
ment and prolongation of the latter. His ideas are more clearly 
defined and he is more certain of himself and his mission-or 
Aufgabe, as he calls it. He has become more set and confirmed 
in his own way of thinking. His style grows more tense and 
vibrant, and as happens with most authors, begins to react 
upon his thought and determine to some extent what his ideas 
shall be. But his work remains essentially destructive; it is still 
the immorality of morality with which he is concerned. As far 
as he may be said ever to have had a constructive impulse it is 
in his next or final stage, which may be called his vertiginous 
period, being marked by numerous allusions to dancing, floating, 
soaring, rope-walking, and such like dizzy acrobatic exercises. 
Its principal productions are Zarathustra, the Nietzschean bible, 
and Beyond Good and Eril. It is to this stage of his life, as I 
have just said, that his constructive ideas, if so they may be 
called, belong. It is the time of "the Everlasting Recurrence" 
and the "Superman," the conception of the new morality or 
discipline, the training for conquest-it is the ja~sagende period 
or period of affirmation. 
As such it is dominated by the fantastic figure of Zarathustra 
as his earlier period was dominated by that of Wagner. Not that 
Zarathustra is himself the perfected superman or consumma-
tion; he is rather the Wegweiser, the guide or the teacher of the 
higher order. In his manner he is the mature embodiment of the 
Nietzschean heroic-a conception tentatively expressed in two 
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blond beast," grasping, encroaching, aggressive, disciplined for 
conquest, the master of power and success, imperial and aristo-
cratic (vornehm is his word), in short, the very thing he was not, 
but the very thing he would be-the very thing, perhaps, that 
in his Dionysian intoxication he may have fancied himself. 
Nothing at first thought could be stranger-save to the alienist 
-than to find a man blaspheming his own virtues in a series of 
staccado denials wrung from him by his own debility. It all 
indicates how little he knew himself. He expatiates upon his 
modesty and warns himself against self-depreciation as his be-
setting sin; but he has no hesitation in speaking of himself as 
"the most independent mind in Europe and the only German 
writer," while elsewhere he denominates himself a "fatality" 
and in the same letter, to Brandes, remarks that "in ten years 
the whole world will be writhing in convulsions" on his account-
a prophecy of which some credulous critics believe we are now 
seeing the fulfilment albeit a little tardily. In his own opinion 
Zarathustra is "an event without a parallel in literature and 
philosophy and poetry and morality," while he considers him-
self to be "by all odds the most independent and profoundest 
thinker in the grand style extant." As for anyone who has the 
slightest conception of his significance, he is convinced that such 
an one must start out with the postulate that he has had a wider 
experience in his own person than any man who ever lived. In a 
word, his professions concerning himself are utterly unreliable. 
But nevertheless it is impossible to understand him without 
reckoning with this instinctive reaction against himself as a 
creature of his civilization which constitutes the motive of the 
second and characteristic period of his intellectual being. 
For convenience, however, this general period may be split 
into two minor or sub-periods. The first is composed of a crepus-
cular stage reaching to 1882, which is represented by the collec-
tion of apothegms entitled Human All Too Human, 1878, and 
Miscellaneous Opinions, 1879. During this interval his health 
was very bad and his spirit correspondingly affected. As a 
consequence his utterances are the briefest of any he has written-
sometimes but a few lines in length, hardly more than breathless 
jottings-generally destructive in character, searchings or 
gropings in the dusk of his own consciousness. His line is not 
wholly clear to him as yet; though as the Einsamer, the recluse, 
the great solitary genius, as whom he has begun to pose, it is 
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of the Untimely Considerations, in Schopenhauer as an Educator 
and Richard Wagner at Bayreuth. To a certain extent he is 
nothing but Nietzsche himself magnified and enhaloed by the 
fumes of the Dionysian Rausch or inebriation. As this vision 
grows upon him, his language enters upon an apocalyptic stage, 
which becomes ever more nervous, shrill, and exalted as the 
crisis approaches. 
Such are Nietzsche's chief literary dates and titles. To 
reconcile all the opinions emitted during these years would be 
an impossible task. There are few ideas, I suppose, in whose 
favour it would not be possible to quote a text from Nietzsche, 
if there were any point in doing so. All the expositor can do in 
such a case is to launch himself upon his author's traces relying 
on his own scent to keep him somewhere near the trail. 
To begin with, then, Nietzsche professed a profound con-
tempt for the value of truth as such. In Plato's Republic there 
is a curious passage, which everyone will recall, to the effect 
that every system of government is founded at bottom upon a 
lie-or more diplomatically, a convention of some sort. So 
Plato in his turn proposes rather diffidently that in the interests 
of social distinctions the members of his polity shall be instructed 
that they are all children of the earth and hence brothers but 
that they are formed of different metals, some more precious 
than others. To be sure he apologizes for the grossness of the 
falsehood, though if he had lived long enough to hear of the 
infallibility of majorities, he might have spared his self-reproaches. 
But at all events in his general principle Nietzsche would have 
cheerfully concurred. According to the latter the test of an idea 
is not its truth but its utility; that is, its power to abuse society 
to its own advantage. "The world with which we have to do, " 
he says, "is false-or in other words, it is not a fact but the 
poetization (A usdichtung) and rounding out of a meagre sum of 
observations; it is in a state of flux as of something becoming, a 
constantly self-shifting falsehood, which never approaches truth 
for-there is no truth." While elsewhere he defines this truth 
which is not, as "a kind of error without which a certain kind of 
living being could not exist. " 
This, then, is the basis of the Nietzschean philosophy-a 
disbelief in truth as a fruitful and practical human motive. To 
be sure, men have mistakenly devoted themselves to the pursuit 
of truth as a high and sacred calling. But whenever they have 
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done so, they and the race have suffered for it. "For what has 
humanity paid the most dearly and for what has it been penalized 
the most severely?" he demands, and answers pitilessly, "For 
its truths." What man lives by is illusion, imagination-error. 
In fact, so riddled and worm-eaten with falsehood is the life of 
man that it is impossible to comprehend the world as the work 
of a moral being; its origin is explicable by an artist-creator 
alone. In his contempt for anything like an absolute standard, 
in his conception of substance only as a shifting illusion Nietzsche 
is not so very far removed from the position of the pragmatists. 
If anything, however, the advantage of clearness, even of honesty 
is so far on his side. At all events he avoids the confusion, the 
ambiguity of confounding being with becoming; he declines to 
apply the term truth to a set of connotations which are entirely 
different. And as usual he suffers the drawback of his honesty. 
To confess to a philosophy of falsehood would seem in itself 
enough to discredit the thinker-one reason, perhaps, why the 
pragmatists have stuck to the name of truth while shuffling 
away the reality. What confidence are we to place in the con-
clusions of a moralist who posits the undesirability of truth and 
the vital necessity of falsehood? The predicament is a serious 
one: either his ideas are true but worthless or else they are useful 
but false. Perhaps it would not be improper to speak of this as 
Nietzsche's intellectual paradox-though as a matter of fact the 
attentive reader encounters any number of others in attempting 
to harmonize the utterances of this spasmodic and inconsequent 
thinker. 
At all events his premises involve the disgrace of reason-a 
position in which he anticipates the anti-intellectualists. Indeed, 
it is not a little creditable to Nietzsche's shrewdness that almost 
all our modern heresies-what we are denominating just now our 
advanced ideas, though they are pre-Socratic, most of them-
find an oracular mouthpiece in him-with the one exception of 
social democracy. He was born to be the prophet of the one-sided 
and unbalanced. It is they who have made his reputation as it is 
he who has given them tongue. Only in this instance, as he has 
continued to use the reason as an instrument of demolition after 
disqualifying it, he has thrown a certain suspicion upon the 
soundness of his own coinage. 
Be this as it may, thus much of his thought is certain. The 
fundamental principle of existence is not the thirst for truth-
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that is a sign of decadence; the worst enemy the vital principle 
has ever known is knowledge. The living instinct is in reality 
the will to power. Superficially the idea is not unlike the under-
lying conception of the Welt als Wille und Vorstellung and was 
unquestionably suggested by his study of Schopenhauer-in 
fact, most of his views are either transformations or inversions. 
But whereas the latter philosopher sees the whole impulse and 
motive of existence, formally at least, in the mere desire or will 
to live, the former sees it in what he considers the vastly more 
potent instinct of personal expansion and aggrandizement. In 
simple terms, life is to Schopenhauer nothing more or less than a 
bad habit, a vice of which we may break ourselves as a race by 
a kind of passivity or resignation of will. To the author of such a 
view humanity is bound to seem a sorry spectacle; his system is 
an unrelieved pessimism centring about the one cardinal virtue 
of pity. But to Nietzsche, who prides himself upon his optimism 
-he remarks very shrewdly that no one so badly off as he can 
afford to be a pessimist; it would look like sheer petulance--to 
him such an hypothesis as Schopenhauer's is not only tempera-
mentally unacceptable but is inadequate to account for the 
tremendous vigour and variety, the elan of life as he interprets 
it. Not mere existence is the aim and end of existence, not the 
bare sustaining of life from day to day, any more than the dis-
covery of truth for its own sake; but assertion, enlargement, 
development. No being worthy of the name is content with a 
mere minimum or even a modicum of possession material or 
other. On such a theory progress, even evolution itself is 
unthinkable; creation would remain forever stationary; possi-
bility would vanish. But every living creature, plant, and animal 
alike, is constantly struggling, striving to free its elbows, to 
stretch its boundaries, to wrench a little more from opportunity. 
The struggle for existence, with its corollary the survival of the 
fittest, implies more than passive adaptation to environment; it 
implies encroachment, aggression, domination whether over 
nature herself or other organisms. Look at the very character 
and conditions of nutrition; we must prey upon something living 
if we ourselves are to live. Conquest is the law of life. 
The genesis of the idea, as related by Nietzsche to his sister, 
is conclusive to its character. It was during the Franco-Prussian 
War, in which he took part as member of the ambulance train, 
that he was resting one evening on a stone wall by a little town 
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in the trail of the army. All of a sudden he was roused from his 
reverie by the thundering hoofs of a squadron of horse galloping 
past, followed by the crashing of a detachment of artillery and 
the pounding of a body of infantry marching at double-quick. 
The whole spectacle was so imposing as a display of organized 
force that "I felt," he says, "for the first time ... that the 
strongest and highest will to live does not come to expression in a 
wretched struggle for existence but as a will to fight, a will to 
power and domination." Consistently he always prided himself 
upon his own truculency. In a letter to Brandes, written in the 
last year of his life. he remarks: "I was born on the battlefield of 
Lutzen; the first name I heard was that of Gustavus Adolphus. 
I understand the management of two arms. the sabre and 
the cannon .... I am by instinct a brave, even a military 
animal." 
In brief, Nietzsche's fundamental principle is the principle of 
imperialism, as its genealogy shows. And the worst is that with 
Nietzsche the conception never rises above its individualistic 
form. Beyond the imperialism of the individual to the imperial-
ism of the group or nation, much less to that of the race where 
human expansion may happily find its full activity in the sub-
jugation of nature-to such a collective outlook Nietzsche never 
attains. His teaching is purely selfish and egotistic and anti-
social. It insists that the whole justification of society consists 
in the production of exceptional individuals. It is for its great 
men that the state exists; the genius is the sole raison d'etre of 
humanity-even his own ethics has no ostensible defence and 
intention save as the morality of genius. To the" herd, " to the 
" others, " who are the mere means or tools for the production 
and maintenance of the genius, it has no application whatsoever. 
Slavery, in fact if not in name, is an indispensable institution for 
the promotion of this one object for which society exists. All 
great polities and nations have been slave-states, as witness 
Athens, Sparta, and Rome. As a matter of fact men are divided 
naturally into just two classes-commanders and obeyers, 
masters and slaves; and it is only an identical proposition to say 
that the former are the state. With numbers and averages and 
complexes he has no patience. At best his ideas may be said to 
answer to the facts of the physical and biological sciences-that 
is, the "natural" sciences; with the moral sciences so-called it 
has nothing to do. Hence its one-sidedness, its deceptive 
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appearance of plausibility when viewed physiologically, and its 
lurking air of insincerity as of one suppressing a portion of the 
truth, a teller of half the story. And even had Nietzsche supplied 
the defects in his education by a later study of the newer and 
more social sciences, he would still have suffered as a moralist 
from his aristocratic bias. In restricting his attention to the 
genius-that is, by definition to the exception-and what was 
worse, to the study of himself as such, he was bound to falsify 
the moral problem; for the ordinary man, for humanity the main 
affair of morals must always be a concern for duty, for obligation 
not for prerogative or privilege; while still further, his ignorance 
of feminine psychology, of woman, of one entire sex crippled 
him even more seriously, if anything, as a moral investigator. 
To return to Nietzsche's point of view, however, it is evident 
from what precedes that not truth but the will to power, the 
instinct of imperialism is the one genuine standard of all values. 
Since it is the desire for expansion and enlargement which is the 
vital principle-not the thirst for knowledge or even the modest 
instinct of self-preservation-it is by the first touchstone that 
every conception, every institution is finally to be tried. Does 
it stimulate and increase and exalt the vitality, it is good; does 
it check or weaken or depress the activities, it is bad. Such, 
in his view, is the explanation of the particular eminence of 
Greek tragedy in its best days. And it is remarkable for the 
persistency of his underlying ideas that the Birth of Tragedy, one 
of his earliest works, should conform in its large outlines to 
principles which come to definitive expression only years later. 
That his belief in the will to power should have been inspired by 
his reading of Greek philosophy seems impossible; it is much 
more likely that his interpretation of antiquity reflects his study 
of Schopenhauer. But then consider what Friedrich Schlegel 
made of the Greeks. There is apparently something peculiarly 
exciting and unsettling for such unbalanced brains in this par-
ticular literature. It is probably on this account that the Greeks 
whom Nietzsche extols are pre-Socratic; Plato and Euripides 
represent for him the decadence of philosophy and drama. But 
in the flourishing of Greek tragedy-a "Dionysian" tragedy-
of which Aeschylus marks the term, he sees an heroic attempt 
on the part of the Greeks to steel their souls to the rigours of life. 
Neither a weak nor a happy people could have conceived such a 
drama. His theory of dramatic origins is rather grotesque, 
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certainly unconvincing; but it is interesting for the distinction it 
draws among the faculties, a distinction which serves in a 
measure as a map of his own mind. According to this classifica-
tion human nature and with it the sources of human inspiration 
are partitioned into two parts or sides-the Apollonian and the 
Dionysian. Roughly, the Apollonian is the intellectual; it is the 
constructive, architectonic faculty or faculties; the Dionysian is 
the instinctive, non-plastic, and musical faculty. To be sure 
these definitions are too clear and definite to represent Nietzsche 
quite correctly; the characteristic state which he assigns to each 
is by no means so lucid as my statement would seem to imply. 
As a matter of fact, it is dreaming which he assigns as the typical 
activity of the Apollonian spirit, having in mind, I suppose, the 
vivid evocative and visualizing power of the dream; while to the 
Dionysian spirit he assigns the typical condition of inebriation or 
Rausch, the state of pregnant though chaotic suggestion. The 
dream and the Rausch-these are the two poles which Nietzsche 
sets to the axis of human genius. For himself he prefers the 
latter. In this curious symbolism or mythology Dionysian not 
only becomes synonymous with oriental and anti-Christian, but 
it also comes to stand for the natural and universal, in contrast 
with the rational and intelligible, which are essentially Apollo-
nian. It is the ground of nature-the bas-fond evidently-
whereon all humanity can meet as on the lap of a common 
mother. It is the source of vital inspirations, the foundation of 
native originality. It is the source to which the Greek genius 
owed its greatness, until those unconscionable reasoners Socrates 
and Plato and Euripides-men of restraints and inhibitions-
succeeded in corrupting it with their colourless discourse and in 
introducing an Apollonian decadence. It is true, the idea shifts 
somewhat under Nietzsche's hand; at some periods he himself is 
more Apollonian than at others, though on the whole it is the 
emerald effulgence of the orgiastic divinity which fills his pupils 
and colours his vision. In the main, however, this is the sense 
of the distinction, whatever face it may wear at any particular 
moment. N or is the conception without ingenuity-the sort of 
perverted ingenuity which was a part of Nietzsche even at his 
worst. It has the advantage of serving as a kind of symbolic or 
even mythic interpretation of some of the facts of common 
experience. There is an analogy, even though fanciful, between 
intoxication and inspiration-a kind of fecund vagueness of 
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consciousness; while the paralysis of the usual inhibitions of 
sobriety produces a subjective, factitious sense of enlargement and 
liberty. On the other hand, the brief though vivid splendour of 
the dream with its penetrating and haunting visions is no bad 
image of the formative phantasy which shapes and realizes the 
crowding and inchoate suggestions of the Rausch. Such, indeed, 
is the upshot of Nietzsche's dramatic theories. And further, the 
association of the two gods themselves is not without significance. 
In particular, the figure of Dionysus Zagreus dilates in Nietzsche's 
mind until it has grown into the antithesis to that other sacrifice, 
the Nazarene, whom he distrusted so-both slain but to what 
different effect; the one the affirmer and lover of life, the other its 
denier and evader. 
In the meanwhile, before the opposition of Dionysian and 
Apollonian had assumed quite these proportions, Nietzsche was 
concerning himself, from the very opening of his second or in-
coherent period, in testing the reigning morality by the criterion 
afforded by his will to power. In reality, I am not sure that his 
condemnation of morality was not fairly complete before he had 
definitely formulated the principle by which to justify it. Cer-
tainly his revolt against morality was the more instinctive and 
was undoubtedly due to suspicion of it as a hindrance to the free 
expansion of life and vitality. Judged by the will to might, as 
Nietzsche understood it, the current morality of his day, as of 
ours, has not a leg to stand on. It is benumbing, depressing, 
crippling-a dam to the stream of self-expansion. Like Plato, 
to whom it is partly due, its last word is restraint and suppression. 
It inculcates meekness and long suffering, pity and unselfish-
ness, self-denial and repression. Its code is a series of prohibi-
tions; its highest wisdom is to refrain. Like the commandments 
its mouth is full of do not's. In sum, it is a morality of denial, a 
no-saying, a veto morality. It is a morality for the weak and 
dispirited and lowly, in whom resignation and obedience are the 
cardinal virtues; not for the strong and sanguine and successful, 
whose merit lies in conquest. It is a slave morality-and from 
the slave Nietzsche derives it and by the character of the slave 
he explains it. 
For Nietzsche's philosophy the point is capital. Divested 
of his questionable etymologies and ethnologies, the distinction 
between the master and the slave morality, upon which his theory 
of morals depends, is about as follows. Naturally there is nothing 
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absolute to Nietzsche about any moral code or standard. He has 
got rid of the notion of absolute with that of substance. A 
morality is at bottom a set of expedients originally invented for 
the advantage or conveniency of its promoters. Such a set of 
prescriptions becomes petrified or crystallized after a while into 
something fixed and apparently inalterable. When so set, it 
exerts a superstitious power over men's minds as of something 
sacred and irreducible. It is quite possible, however, to resolve 
these prescriptions into simple elements, to trace them to their 
origin, and hence to free the mind of their irrational tyranny. 
As the result of such an investigation he arrives at the conclusion 
that the original or primary morality was that of the masters. 
It was what Plato would call the expediency of the powerful. 
Whatever was to the interest of the controlling or conquering 
class was approved. They were the makers of values and their 
might was right. Naturally their own characteristics constituted 
the virtues. Whatever was distinctive of them was denominated 
good; whatever was distinctive of the lower or subjugated class 
or caste, as looked down upon by their superiors, was denominated 
bad (schlecht). From the point of view of these inferiors, however, 
matters would appear reversed: the attributes of the slaves-
patience, gentleness, forbearance, humility, compassion, paci-
fism-would be regarded as good; whatever distinguished their 
superiors as compared with them-haughtiness, severity, 
domination, courage-would be regarded as evil (bose). A 
comparison of the two sets of terms will illuminate the difference 
-good and bad as contrasted with good and evil. And if it is this 
latter couple which belongs to our moral vocabulary to-day, it is 
due to the fact that the noble values, the values of the masters, 
have been dislodged by the mean and belittling values of the 
slaves-the manly and vigorous virtues by the weak and de-
generate ones. This, according to Nietzsche, is the great servile 
revolution from which the world is suffering to-day. It is the 
feeble and cowardly who have succeeded in imposing their 
standards upon the strong and courageous. Unable to conquer 
the latter, they have taken their revenge by infecting the victors 
with their own disease until society is utterly rotten and corrupt. 
This is the first great shift or transvaluation of values, which 
must be reversed before we can expect to regain our health and 
strength. 
In this servile revolt there have been four chief agents or 
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instrumentalities-Socratism and Platonism, Judaism, Chris-
tianity, and modern revolutionism. For the authors of these 
movements Nietzsche is consistently merciless-Socrates, Plato, 
Jesus, St. Paul, the French Revolution. They figure between 
them all that he detested most-rationalism and altruism; that is, 
falsehood and infirmity. What he cannot forgive them is their 
triumph. As a matter of fact they have transformed morality 
in their own sense; they have in a manner proved themselves the 
stronger. They have shown that they too are a force and that 
there are other forces than the physical and carnal forces to which 
Nietzsche confines his attention. They are a standing refutation 
of his philosophy of the will to power. Hence his exasperation. 
Christianity and alcoholism he couples as the two worst curses 
of modern civilization. And he means, not the official, the in-
stitutional, the political Christianity of the churches, but the 
Christian ethics-righteousness in our sense, a sense which was 
shared by Socrates and the Jews, and which was taken up and 
incorporated in the morality of Christianity. What an age of 
surprises the nineteenth century was! Here was Nietzsche 
belabouring it on the one flank for its pusillanimous addiction to 
Christianity and Tolstoy scourging it on the other for its impious 
defection from that same Christianity and the poor old century 
plodding along between them amid the mingled cheers and 
jeers of the bystanders. 
Since the current morality-to continue our pursuit of Niet-
zsche-is a slave morality, a morality calculated for the comfort 
and security of weakness, not for the stimulation and encourage-
ment of strength, a morality which is virtually a denial of the 
vital principle, the will to power-in view of these conclusions it 
will never be well with the world until a readjustment has been 
made. For the advantage of the race there is needed a rectifica-
tion-or in Nietzsche's own words, a transvaluation-of values. 
It is in this sense that he calls himself an "immoralist," not that 
he has no discipline to recommend but that he denies the validity 
of what passes for morality nowadays. This morality may be all 
very well for the lower classes, for the "cattle-men," who need 
a "cattle-morality," for the Vielzllviele and the Ueberflussige. 
But before life can attain its fulness, before life can" surpass 
itself, " there must be a counter-revolution in favour of the strong 
and masterful. 
It is at this point that Nietzsche's work of construction 
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actually begins-with. the introduction of the superman. The 
superman may be defined in a general way as the consummation 
of humanity. It is not a new type or species produced by the 
process of evolution-with respect to evolution as such Nietzsche 
has his reserves; the superman is, in Nietzschean phraseology, an 
instance of life surpassing itself. In other words, he is a being 
who lives successfully in accordance with the will to power. 
Since society is justified, not by its average, but by its exceptions, 
he is the acme of society properly understood. He is the glorifica-
tion of conquest, who, in order to triump hover others, has 
learned to triumph over himself. He has learned to say" yes" 
to life, to will it with all its pains and horrors. For since it is but 
weakness to revolt or strive against a fate greater than oneself, 
the superman must school himself to will with fate. Amor jati! 
Then what is, is in accordance with his will too. He must will 
even the everlasting recurrence-in Nietzsche's opinion the most 
sublime of human conceptions, at once the most awful and the 
most consoling of truths and the most searching test of the 
superman's superiority. 
Like most of Nietzsche's dogmas the everlasting recurrence is 
nothing new. It is to be found in antiquity-most modern ideas 
are; but what is more singular, it was put forward by two French-
men at about the same time with Nietzsche-a certain Blanqui 
and the well known Dr. Le Bon. Stated in so many words it 
sounds almost puerile. For this reason I had better translate 
Nietzsche's version of it. 
"The world of forces suffers no diminution; for otherwise it had grown 
weak in the course of infinity, and perished. The world of forces suffers no 
pause; for otherwise the period had been reached and the clock of being were 
still. The world of forces never attains an equilibrium; it has never a moment 
of rest, its power and its movement are equally great at every time. Whatever 
condition the world can reach it must have reached, and not once but often. 
So of this instant; it was there once already and many times, and will recur 
again; and so with the instant which bore this and with that which is the child 
of the present. Man! Thy whole life is ever and again reversed like an hour-
glass and ever and again runs out-a great moment of time between until all 
the conditions out of which thou hast ccme return again in the circuit of the 
world. And then thou shalt find again every grief and every joy and every 
friend and every foe and every hope and every error and every blade of grass 
and every ray of sunshine-the whole concatenation of all things. This ring 
in which thou art a portion gleams ever again. And in every ring of human 
life in general there is always an hour when first to one, then to many, then to 
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all the mightiest thought appears, that of the everlasting return of all things-
that is always for humanity the hour of midday. " 
Alone in the Engadine when this stupendous revelation struck 
him, Nietzsche says, he was almost prostrated by the insupport-
able horror of the thought. It is characteristic of his scientific 
naivete that he should have attached any importance to such a 
notion. As a matter of fact, however, he makes it the crucial 
test of his man of power-the latter's ability to bear this vision of 
disheartening repetition and to will this too with the rest of life-
yes, even to rejoice in it. Indeed, it is just this ordinance of fate 
which makes the superman necessary-for Nietzsche is not always 
guiltless of using his conclusions to prove his premises-the 
superman alone is capable of bearing up against it; only the 
superman can live and flourish under such a dispensation. 
Such, then, is the superman in silhouette. He is the victor 
(the Sieger) and hence the maker of values. He is the affirmer 
(the Ja-sagende) and hence the giver to humanity of significance 
and direction. The inconsistency of imparting direction to that 
which is ordained to a circular revolution or of significance to that 
which has no aim or goal seems never to have occurred to 
Nietzsche., But then it would be only too easy to pick out con-
tradictions among his scattered and unassembled statements. 
Nietzsche does not reason, he apprehends; he does not prove, he 
affirms. I have already spoken of that characteristic of his mind 
which seems to me to serve as a handy expression for most of his 
peculiarities-its susceptibility to polarization; and the same 
expression will apply as well here to that repulsion from his own 
being which resulted in the type of the superman as embodied in 
Zarathustra. And to those who are satiated with the present 
cult of futility, the glorification of the amiable, good-natured 
weakling, the protest as such ought not to be wholly antipathetic. 
It should not be supposed, however, that the superman of 
whom Nietzsche dreamed is a creature of unbridled passions and 
uncurbed impulses. For the perfection of such a human being, 
when once bred, there is requisite a long and arduous discipline. 
He is not a force qui va like Victor Hugo's heroes. Nietzsche, 
unscientific as he was in the sense of any particular branch of 
science, had not lived in a scientific age wholly for nothing. His 
ideal is the old ideal of violence, to be sure; but it has been modi-
fied by the physical and biological ideas of the time. The differ-
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ence between his notion and Victor Hugo's is measured by the 
change which the conception of "nature" and "natural" has 
undergone in the interval. His ideal is still that of the" natural" 
man as was Rousseau's, the man without a higher law or will 
than his own-though what concessions he has to make to secure 
the supremacy of that will in schooling himself to will what is, I 
have already pointed out; but that in itself is a kind of discipline 
undreamed of by Rousseau. It might seem, indeed, as though 
Nietzsche surrendered the whole point here-and it must be 
confessed that it is harder to reconcile his constructive than his 
dest~uctive inconsistencies; but if he does yield anything, he is 
quite unconscious of doing so. To this Rousseauist conception 
of the" natural" man, the man of force or violence or impulse of 
1830 or thereabouts, he has added the idea of "efficiency," a 
later and" scientific" idea. In a word, Nietzsche's whole thought 
might be described as the marriage of the romanticism and the 
scientificism-if I may be allowed the word-or the inhumanism 
of the nineteenth century. Accordingly his idea of power may 
be defined as force plus" efficiency." To the early romanticists 
"efficiency" was a small matter-in fact, an "efficient" hero 
would hardly have been a romantic one. To the scientific 
romanticists, the physical and biological romanticists in general 
and Nietzsche in particular it is everything. And perhaps it is 
in this manner that he would justify the amor fati. In any case 
discipline is necessary to this end; there is no power, no conquest 
without it. His training may be summed up in a precept from the 
superman's bible, Zarathustra: "Be hard." Let the slaves and 
the underlings retain the soft and emasculate morality of Chris-
tianity and humanitarianism, the superman must be hard, not 
only to others but to himself-harder, indeed, to himself than 
others. These, perhaps, are the two most comprehensive 
commandments for the superman: "Be hard" and " Live 
dangerousl y. ' , 
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